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abstract: One of the main problems impeding the evolution of
cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the
quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem
that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutu-
alisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by
which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we
propose a general mechanism of partner choice, “screening,” that is
similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the
appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals
to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a
noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct
partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological sym-
bioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid,
ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that
produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic
tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-
products, partner ﬁdelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply,
therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it
is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness
beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont
misbehavior.
Keywords: cooperation, symbiosis, microbiome, Vibrio ﬁscheri,v i r -
ulence, parasitism.
Introduction
The Problem of Partner Choice
Every mutualism in nature is beset by two fundamental
challenges that arise because informationisasymmetrically
distributed: the host knows less about its potential partner
than that partner knows about itself. After an interaction
is established, this asymmetry takes the form of hidden
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actions: what prevents an individual from exploiting the
resources of the host or from refusing to cooperate? This
problem has been analyzed extensively, and in general, the
solution is believed to rely on some form of host-mediated
feedback in which symbiont behaviors are rewarded or
punished in ways that favor the ﬁtnesses of cooperative
symbionts (West et al. 2002a, 2002b; Sachs et al. 2004;
Edwards et al. 2006). If the host response evolved de novo
as an adaptation to maintain mutualism, then thefeedback
is termed a host sanction (West et al. 2002a, 2002b),
whereas if the host response is a preadapted and general-
purpose response to environmental setbacks, then it is
termed a partner ﬁdelity feedback (Weyl et al. 2010).
Before the interaction is established, however, hosts face
another fundamental challenge: that of choosing a good
partner. Here the information asymmetry takes the form
of hidden characteristics: the potential partners know their
own quality and can therefore behave accordingly, but the
potential host does not. In biology, this is usually known
as the problem of “partner choice,” and it has been deﬁned
to mean interactions in which individuals “differentially
reward cooperative vs. uncooperative partners in advance
of any possible exploitation” (Bull and Rice 1991, p. 63,
italics added). Partner choice is our focus here.
In some situations, the problem of partner choice can
be solved by signaling: the informed player sends a costly
signal regarding his own quality to the noninformed
player, who can accept or reject. Signaling theory is well
known in the ﬁeld of sexual selection and mate choice
(Grafen 1990; reviews in Maynard Smith and Harper 2003;
Searcy and Nowicki 2005). In addition, although rarely
included in the standard repertoire of solutions for the
maintenance of mutualism (Yu 2001; Sachs et al. 2004),
there do exist a few reports of costly, honest signaling in
pollination mutualisms (Møller 1995; Armbruster et al.
2005; see also Schaefer et al. 2004; Edwards et al. 2007).76 The American Naturalist
However, we will not focus on signaling. Instead, we are
interested in the problem of partner choicewheresignaling
is not possible or where the noninformed individual can-
not actively choose. Is partner choice possible without
signaling?
Partner Choice without Signaling
Partner choice without signaling occurs in a very well-
studied symbiosis: that between the bioluminescent bac-
terium Vibrio ﬁscheri and the marine bobtail squid Eu-
prymna scolopes (reviews in Ruby and McFall-Ngai 1999;
Small and McFall-Ngai 1999; Visick and McFall-Ngai
2000; Nyholm and McFall-Ngai 2004; Ruby et al. 2004;
McFall-Ngai 2008). The squid provides V. ﬁscheri colonies
with food and housing inside a specialized light organ, and
the bacteria expend energy to produce light, which is taken
to beneﬁt the squid (possibly allowing the squid to avoid
throwing a moonlight shadow on seaﬂoors, which would
reveal its location to predators). Only bioluminescent V.
ﬁscheri strains have been found in the light organs of the
squid, although nonluminescent mutants arise spontane-
ously in laboratory culture. This is striking if we consider
that luminescence per se is not essential for the bacteria;
indeed, it demands about 20% of the metabolic potential
of a bacterium, and nonluminescent mutants enjoy higher
growth rates under laboratory conditions. However, ex-
perimentation reveals that mutant bacteria unable to in-
duce normal luminescence have a three- to fourfold defect
in the ability to colonize the squid (Visick et al. 2000).
The squid is colonized (mostly) once, at the beginning of
its life, and there is no indication that V. ﬁscheri is able to
honestly signal its luminescence capability before coloni-
zation or that the squid is able to identify and punish
preferentially nonluminescent strains, although squid
macrophages do appear to be able to recognize V. ﬁscheri
generally (Nyholm et al. 2009). How does a bobtail squid
recruit luminescent bacteria when the bacteria cannot sig-
nal and the squid cannot choose? We use the V. ﬁscheri–
E. scolopes mutualism to introduce the concept of screen-
ing, and we discuss further examples in a later section.
Screening
An effective method for screening luminescent bacteria
from nonluminescent ones would be to impose a strategic
cost on the bacteria (a cost that is not necessarily useful
otherwise to either party) that induces them to enter the
squid only if they are luminescent. The squid seems to
have found such a strategy. The light organ of the squid
is rich in enzymes that can produce reactive oxygen species
(ROSs; e.g., hydrogen peroxide) that are toxic for bacteria,
including V. ﬁscheri. Only bacteria that produce the en-
zyme luciferase are able to prevent damage by ROSs, be-
cause luciferase consumes molecular oxygen (O2)f r o mt h e
surrounding environment in a reaction that emits light
(Ruby and McFall-Ngai 1999). Vibrio ﬁscheri bacteria are
selected to pay the cost of luciferase activity because the
consequent reduction in oxygen in the light organ removes
the input to host production of ROSs. High-quality bac-
teria (with active luciferase) are able to pay this cost, and
in return they receive high levels of food resources (Visick
et al. 2000). Low-quality bacteria (without luciferase) ﬁnd
that paying the cost is not proﬁtable (they are not viable
in a light organ, due to ROS build-up) and therefore they
should not evolve to enter the host.
The equilibrium outcome is that the bacteria self-screen:
high-quality bacteria evolve to associate with the host and
low-quality bacteria evolve to be free living. Screening by
using the threat of ROSs is effective because the quality
that is relevant for the squid (light production) is strictly
linked (it is a by-product in the samebiochemicalreaction)
with the quality that is relevant for the bacterium to enter
the association (prevention of ROS production). Impor-
tantly, there is no other known use by the squid for the
production of ROSs or the enzymes that produce them,
nor is there another known use by this bacteria for lucif-
erase production. Enzyme production appears to be a
“strategic waste” of resources, and one that makes screen-
ing possible.
In the V. ﬁscheri–E. scolopes mutualism, therefore, the
problem of partner choice is solved not by signaling (the
informed party signals and the noninformed party
chooses) but by what we call “screening” (the nonin-
formed party sets up certain conditions that the informed
party can accept or reject). This is reminiscent of contract
theory in microeconomics.
Model
A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice
The problem of hidden characteristics in partner choice
exists in microeconomics, too (Bolton and Dewatripont
2005). Imagine an employer facing the problem of hiring
an employee. The employee knows his own quality better
than the employer does. How does an employer hire only
high-quality employees? This problem, in its strategic
structure, is not different from the one faced by a host
that is trying to establish a mutualistic interaction with a
symbiont. In economics, the hidden-characteristics prob-
lem is known as the problem of “adverse selection” (Ak-
erlof 1970). The signaling solution to the adverse selection
problem was formalized in economics 20 years earlier than
in biology (notably, by Spence 1973; reviewed in Ham-
merstein and Hagen 2005). The screening solution (Roth-Screening In and Screening Out 77
Figure 1: Screening game. The principal can be demanding or nonde-
manding; the agent can always enter the interaction or enter when he is
Q (high quality). The payoff for an agent is 1 when the principal is
nondemanding and when the principal is demanding, where ai is 1  ai
the cost for entering the interaction for an agent of type ( i p q, Q 0 !
). The payoff for a principal interacting with an agent of type i a ! a Qq
is ( ); being demanding has a cost d for the principal. If 1  pp ! p i Qq
the agent does not enter the interaction, he has a payoff A; if the principal
does not enter the interaction, she has a payoff P. The frequency of Q
agents is 1/2. A, The game in strategic form. Each cell shows the payoffs
to the agent (bottom left) and the principal (top right) in the general case
and where , , , , , and A p 0.8 P p 0.8 p p 0 p p 0.6 a p 0.1 a p Qq Q q
; . In the simultaneous game, the best strategy is for the 0.8 d p 0.05
principal to be nondemanding and for the agent to always enter. B,T h e
game in extensive form. The black circles show a player’s move; the open
circles show the end of a subgame, when payoffs are assigned to the
principal (top) and the agent (bottom); gray branches show the dominant
strategies for each subgame; the best strategy for the principal is to be
demanding and for the agent to enter only when he is Q.
schild and Stiglitz 1976; Stiglitz 1977) appears to have
never been introduced formally to biology, so we do that
here.
Two Screening Games
The simplest version of the problem of adverse selection
can be described, using the terminology of economics, as
follows: an individual (the principal) wants to contract
another (the agent) to engage in an interaction. Agents
are of two types ( , Q), which the principal cannot i p q
tell apart before any association is established; Q agents
are mutualistic and q agents are parasitic. Agents cannot
signal their type (or, equivalently, the principal cannot
choose them). Is it possible for the principal to enter an
interaction with Q agents only and to avoid q agents? Or,
alternatively, is it possible for the principal to give different
rewards to the different types without being able to assess
their quality? It is one of the most remarkable results of
microeconomics that a solution to this problem exists. In
signaling models, the problem of asymmetric information
is solved by the fact that the agents signal their quality
and then the principal chooses according to that signal.
In screening models, by contrast, principals move ﬁrst by
setting up certain demands, and then the agents move
second by assessing the demands and choosing whether
to accept.
To demonstrate a simple screening game (ﬁg. 1), let us
ﬁrst assume that the principal wants to recruit only Q
agents because, say, hosting q agents is worse than hosting
no one. To do this, she imposes a cost for entering the
interaction, and the cost is designed such that Q agents
can afford to pay it and still ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the
interaction but q agents cannot afford to pay it and there-
fore ﬁnd it proﬁtable to avoid entering the interaction. We
call a principal that imposes such a cost a “demanding”
principal. In this way, only Q agents will enter the inter-
action (ﬁg. 1). The agents, in other words, screen them-
selves in or out according to their own quality; the prin-
cipal does not choose, and never knows, the quality of any
individual agent; she simply sets certain working condi-
tions (a “contract”) that the agents, considering the re-
wards and conditions offered by the principal, evolve to
accept (becoming symbionts) or reject (remaining free
living).
In the second instance, now let us assume that the prin-
cipal wants to attract both types of agents; this mightoccur
if hosting a q agent is better than hosting no one. The key
to doing so is that multiple different sets of conditions to
enter the interaction must be created and tailored to the
types of agents that the principal wants to attract. If the
contracts (the rewards and the costs) are designed in the
right way, the agents will againscreenthemselvesaccording
to their own quality and the different sets of conditions
offered by the principal; the principal will again achieve
separation of the two agent types without having to ob-
serve and choose. This second instance requires a more78 The American Naturalist
Figure 2: Adverse selection and market segmentation. The graphs represent the set of all possible reward-for-protection contracts (w, e) between
agents and principals. Curves to the upper left indicate increments in ﬁtness (p) for the principal (less reward, more effort), and lines to the lower
right indicate increments in ﬁtness (a) for the agents (more reward, less effort). For each agent type there is a set of points, which we call the
“contract boundary,” deﬁned here by the lines ; the boundaries represent contracts for which , and all contracts below the boundary e p vwa p 0 i i
confer positive ﬁtness to the agent. By deﬁnition, good agents derive higher ﬁtness from a ﬁxed quantity of reward (value the reward more) than
do bad agents, so . As a result, principals can feasibly demand from good agents more effort e for the same amount of reward w than from v 1 v Qq
bad agents, and thus, good agents have a larger contract space in which ﬁtness is positive. Principals maximize their ﬁtness p by offering contracts
at the boundary (i.e., demanding the most effort for a given amount of reward); they derive a greater ﬁtness from good agents ( ) than p p h  e
from bad agents ( ). A, If principals can discriminate between good and bad agents after colonization, then when they are hosting good agents, p p h
p would be maximized with a high-effort contract (wQ, eQ), and when they are hosting bad agents, it would be maximized with a low-effort contract
(wq, eq; curved lines). However, if principals cannot limit each agent type to the appropriate contract, adverse selection occurs and good agents are
selected to choose the (wq, eq) contract, which lies below the contract boundary for the good agent and thus confers greater ﬁtness to the good
agent than does the boundary (wQ, eQ) contract, speciﬁcally . In short, good agents evolve to be lazy because the opportunity is there to a p g 1 0 Q
do so. B, If principals cannot discriminate, market segmentation (screening) can nonetheless be made to occur; a mutant principal evolves to offer
a new contract at ( ) along the new boundary , which lies within the region of positive ﬁtness for the good agent, .
   w , ee p v w  ga p g 1 0 QQ Q Q
Compared with the original, the new boundary means that the mutant principal demands lower effort for any given amount of reward, which can
be interpreted as the transfer of ﬁtness from the principal to the agent; the value of that transfer should evolve to be no more than needed to make
the ( ) and (wq, eq) contracts equivalent in the eyes of the good agent so that the good agent is indifferent between the two contracts and
   w , e QQ
evolves to colonize both types of principal. In contrast, the bad agent continues to colonize only (wq, eq) principals, because ( ) would provide
   w , e QQ
a negative ﬁtness. The new mutant principal consequently enjoys higher ﬁtness, .
   p p h  e 1 h
involved exposition, one possible scenario of which we
outline here and in ﬁgure 2.
Let there be two types of agents: good ( ) and bad i p Q
( ). Let w be the quantity/quality of rewards provided i p q
by the principal and let e be the effort from the agent
demanded by the principal (a cost for the agent, a beneﬁt
for the principal); the pair (w, e) is known as a contract.
Let vi be the valuation of food rewards made by a type i
agent, where , and let be the cost to the v 1 v 1 0 c(w) Qq
principal of producing reward w (an increasing function
of w). The ﬁtness function of an agent of quality i is
a (w, e) p vw  e, ii
and the ﬁtness function of the principal is
p(w, e) p e  c(w).
Both agent and principal try to maximize their own ﬁtness
functions.
If a principal is unable to choose the identityofitsagents
but can nonetheless discriminate between the two types
once colonized, a principal interacting with good agents
would simply demand high effort and offer high rewards
(wQ, eQ) and would derive a high ﬁtness , where p p h  e
e is an increment of ﬁtness gained by hosting a good agent
and is the ﬁtness gained by hosting a bad agent. A p p h
principal interacting with a bad agent would have no
choice but to demand less effort (a bad agent by its nature
cannot provide more) and also offer low rewards (wq, eq).
As a result, the second principal would derive a lower
ﬁtness, , but one that is the best achievable (ﬁg. 2A). p p h
In short, and . Furthermore, assuming that w 1 we 1 e Qq Q q
all agents are specialists, each type of agent would “sign”
its contract (evolve to accept the interaction) as long as
the value of the contract were even slightly positive,
. a (w, e) 1 0 i
However, if principals were unable to direct the appro-
priate contract to each agent type, a process known inScreening In and Screening Out 79
economics as adverse selection would take place. The bad
agent has no incentive to “break” its contract, but the good
agent does because the good agent’s ﬁtness is higher under
the less demanding (wq, eq) contract, since the good agent
can gain more ﬁtness with lower effort (v w  e 1 Qq q
) than it loses with lower rewards (ﬁg. 2B). As v w  e QQ Q
a result, both types of agents would sign the minimum-
protection contract (wq, eq), and the principal would lose
ﬁtness (from to ) and evolve to offer p p h  e p p h Qq
only low-protection contracts. In biological terms, under
the conditions presented here, the presence of unobserv-
able parasites in the system causes good agents to be se-
lected to be more parasitic, even though it would be to
their hosts’ and their own beneﬁt to exchange more re-
sources for more protection.
Hence, there is a selective advantage for the principal
to evolve a new contract ( ) that offers an inter-
   w , e QQ
mediate level of rewards in exchange for an intermediate
level of effort, that is, and . Im-
   w 1 w 1 we 1 e 1 e QQq Q Q q
portantly, the new contract ( ) would evolve tovalues
   w , e QQ
such that good agents get the same ﬁtness that they get
from the low protection contract (wq, eq). That is, the new
contract lies on the same agent ﬁtness isocline as the (wq,
eq) contract where . When the principal offers a p g 1 0 Q
a small improvement of the contract, good agents are no
longer indifferent and they sign for this intermediate con-
tract. The interesting consequence of thisnewintermediate
contract is that it causes market segmentation by per-
suading each type of agent to reveal its preference. Bad
agents continue to sign up only for principals offering the
original contract (wq, eq), but good agents are indifferent
between contracts (wq, eq) and ( ). Therefore, prin-
   w , e Q Q
cipals offering the low-protection contract (wq, eq) are col-
onized by good and bad agents, but principals offering the
alternative contract ( ) are colonized only by good
   w , e QQ
agents (ﬁg. 2B). The principal derives an intermediate ﬁt-
ness from hosting good agents , where
   p p h  ee 1
.
  e 1 0
Finding the Optimal Contract
The simple game (ﬁg. 1) and the more involved analysis
(ﬁg. 2) discussed above suggest how choosing the right
costs and rewards can allow a principal to screen agents
of unknown quality, but both analyses are useful only at
a conceptual level. One wants to ask whether the costs
and rewards are the optimal values. In other words, how
do we calculate the optimal contract? The method of con-
strained optimization, which we introduce here, provides
a way to ﬁnd the optimal effort to impose and the optimal
reward to offer (for a more general treatment on con-
strained maximization, see, e.g., Simon and Blume 1994;
Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). We also describe, in a later
section, how the model can be mapped to the speciﬁc case
of the Vibrio ﬁscheri–Euprymna scolopes mutualism.
We assume that the principal can offer a reward w to
an agent for a task that requires an effort e. The ﬁtness
of the agent depends on the beneﬁt he gets from the u(w)
reward w and from the cost of the effort e; that is, v(e)
. Beneﬁt and cost are increasing in w and e, u(w) v(e)
respectively. If an agent does not interact with a principal,
he gets a payoff for free living that is called the agent’s
reservation utility (A). An agent will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
accept interacting with a principal if and only if his net
utility from entering the interaction is at least as large as
A. The ﬁtness of the principal depends on the beneﬁt
he gets from the effort e and on the cost of the b(e) c(w)
reward w. Beneﬁt and cost are increasing in e and w,
respectively. If a principal does not interact with an agent,
he gets a payoff P (the principal’s reservation utility). The
problem for the principal is to set up the right conditions
(w
∗ and e
∗) to maximize her own ﬁtness, subject to the
constraint that only Q agents accept the interaction (e.g.,
the scenario in ﬁg. 1). That is,
() Max (bec(w)) (1a) (e,w)
subject to
u(w) v(e) ≥ A,( 1 b )
u(w)  kv(e) ! A,( 1 c )
where speciﬁes that a q agent has a larger disutility k 1 1
than a Q agent for the same effort level.
Alternatively, we can assume that the principal can offer
two different tasks, one designed for low-quality agents
( ) and one for high-quality agents ( ; e.g., the i p qi p Q
scenario in ﬁg. 2). In this case, the beneﬁt and the cost
for the agents ( and ) and for the principal u(w) v(e) ii
( and ) depend on the effort ei and reward wi b(w) c(e) ii
associated with the task chosen by each agent. If fi is the
frequency of agents of type i, then the ﬁtness of the prin-
cipal is . The problem f (b(e )  c(w ))  f (b(e )  c(w )) QQ Q qq q
for the principal is to maximize her own ﬁtness, subject
to two kinds of constraints. First, both types of agents
must ﬁnd the conditions of the interaction more proﬁtable
than being free living (constraints [2b] and [2c]); second,
each agent type must prefer the conditions designed for
that type to the ones designed for the other type (con-
straints [2d] and [2e]):
Max f (b(e )  c(w ))  (1  f )(b(e )  c(w )) (e ,w ,e ,w )Q Q Q Q q q qq QQ
(2a)
subject to80 The American Naturalist
u(w ) v(e ) ≥ A, (2b) QQ
u(w )  kv(e ) ≥ A, (2c) qq
u(w ) v(e ) ≥ u(w ) v(e ), (2d) QQ qq
u(w )  kv(e ) ≥ u(w )  kv(e ). (2e) qq QQ
The solution is that the task designed for q agents must
be less demanding than the task designed for Q agents,
and it must also be sufﬁciently less rewarding thatQ agents
do not choose it.
A Numerical Example
Consider the following example. Let the cost of the reward
and the beneﬁt of the effort for the c(w) p wb (e) p be
principal be linear functions of w and e, respectively
( ). Let the beneﬁt of the reward for the b 1 0 u(w) p w
agent also be linear in w, while the cost of the
2 v(e) p e
effort be nonlinear in e.
If the principal offers only one task (designed for the
Q agents), the solution is given by equation (1a) subject
to conditions (1b) and (1c): the optimal effort required is
and the optimal reward is ; there-
∗∗ ∗ 2 e p b/2 w p A  e
fore, the reward paid at equilibrium increases with A and
b (the reward paid to the agents must be higher if their
reservation utility A and the effort required are high). At
equilibrium, Q agents have ﬁtness if they
∗∗ 2 w  e p A
interact with a principal. That is, at equilibrium, agents
are indifferent to being free living or entering the sym-
biosis; an inﬁnitesimal additional reward e is sufﬁcient to
induce agents to enter the interaction.Incontrast,qagents,
if they accepted the interaction, would have ﬁtness
; therefore, q agents do not accept. The prin-
∗∗ 2 w  ke ! A
cipal has ﬁtness if the total num-
∗∗ f (be  w )  (1  f )P QQ
ber of available partners (q and Q) is the same as the
number of required partners, or it has ﬁtness ( )
∗∗ be  w
if there are enough Q agents to partner all principals.
If the principal offers two tasks, the solution is given
by equation (2a) subject to conditions (2b)–(2e): the op-
timal effort required for task 1 is still , which will
∗ e p b/2 1
attract only Q agents, but the reward for this task is now
increased to . The portion in
∗∗ 2 ∗2 w p A  e  (k  1)e 11 2
excess of (the optimal reward in the case of one
∗2 A  e1
task) is needed in order to dissuade Q agents from choos-
ing task 2. The effort required in task 2 is
∗ e p b(f  2Q
, and the reward offered is .
∗∗ 1)/[2(f  k)] w p A  ke Q2 2
Both are lower than for task 1, but now q agents will ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to accept task 2; Q agents instead will prefer
task 1 because of its increased reward . This ex-
∗2 (k  1)e2
cess proﬁt is known as the “informational rent” that ac-
crues to the Q agent as the result of the principal’s inability
to tell agent types apart a priori. Q agents have ﬁtness
, while q agents have ﬁtness
∗∗ 2 ∗2 w  e p A  (k  1)e 1 A 11 2
. Note that the principal would have had
∗∗ 2 w  ke p A 22
to pay only if she coulddifferentiateQfromqagents. A  e
The informational rent is the cost to pay with
∗2 (k  1)e2
asymmetric information to achieve separation when sig-
naling is not possible. The principal has ﬁtness
∗ f (be  Q1
.
∗∗ ∗ w )  (1  f )(be  w ) 1Q 2 2
Should the principal offer one or two tasks? Offering
only one task (to Q agents) instead of two tasks results in
a higher expected payoff to the principal if
2 P 1 b (g 
; that is, the reservation utility P for the prin- 1)/[4(f  k)] Q
cipal must be large enough to make offering one task
worthwhile (it must be worth it to be free living). This
situation could be obtained, for example, if q agents are
parasites. If P is not sufﬁciently high, the principal will
prefer to offer contracts to low-quality individuals too,
even though this results in the principal paying the in-
formational rent. That said, it will not always be biolog-
ically feasible to offer two tasks; the situation in which
only one task is offered (and the alternative for the agent
is to remain free living) seems easier to envisage in biology.
Discussion
The Vibrio ﬁscheri–Euprymna scolopes Symbiosis
At a qualitative level, there are at least four simple pre-
dictions that should be tested in order to classify partner
choice as screening. We will discuss these predictions for
the case of the V. ﬁscheri–E. scolopes symbiosis as a sug-
gestion for possible further tests in this system. Analogous
considerations can be made for other systems.
1. A strategic cost imposed on the potential symbionts. The
detoxiﬁcation of ROSs requires about 20% of the meta-
bolic costs of the bacteria; the cost of the production of
ROSs by the squid is also nonnegligible.
2. Active screening of the potential symbionts. Did lu-
minescent bacteria evolve to enter squid? Did putative
nonluminescent symbionts evolve to avoid entering, ordid
they never evolve to enter in the ﬁrst place? Although this
aspect of the evolutionary history of the symbiosis is not
known, there is strong indirect evidence. Colonization is
an active behavior by V. ﬁscheri in that they swim up a
duct to the light organ against a squid-produced current
(Nyholm and McFall-Ngai 2003). A desirable test of active
screening would be to observe the evolution of bacteria
in environments with squid that do not produce ROSs (or
in which ROSs are neutralized in some way); a nonde-
manding host should lead to the evolution of nonlumi-
nescent strains that colonize the squid.
3. Lack of signaling. Signaling does not rule out the
possibility of additional screening mechanisms. However,
a lack of signaling or the inability of the host to chooseScreening In and Screening Out 81
its partners clearly makes a stronger case for screening. It
seems clear that signaling is absent in the V. ﬁscheri–E.
scolopes mutualism: the bacteria do not luminesce before
colonization, and the squid is unable to choose among
them anyway.
4. Lack of punishment. Screening does not rule out the
possibility of additional punishment mechanisms to en-
force cooperation, and the occurrence of punishment does
not rule out screening before the mutualism is established.
A lack of punishment, however, would make the need for
screening stronger. We could hypothesize that bobtail
squid take in all bacteria and kill off the ones that cannot
detoxify ROSs. In fact, indiscriminate uptake of bacteria
and small particles does occur in the ﬁrst hour of the
squid’s life (Nyholm and McFall-Ngai 2003). However,
because V. ﬁscheri is rare in the environment, indiscrim-
inate uptake of bacteria as a sole strategy would ﬁll the
light organ almost entirely with nonmutualistic bacteria;
in fact, the light organ empties before colonization by V.
ﬁscheri. Furthermore, because detoxiﬁcation of the light
organ environment requires wholesale reductioninoxygen
concentration, it is not possible to kill off nonluminescent
bacteria selectively.
The model also makes quantitative predictions that de-
pend on three parameters and four functions. If one could
manipulate these parameters and know the shape of these
functions, one could predict the optimal reward and cost
and therefore conduct quantitative tests of the screening
mechanism. The parameters are as follows:
P, the reservation utility for the squid. Squid lacking the
light provided by V. ﬁscheri should suffer a ﬁtness cost,
probably in the form of higher predation risk; therefore,
it is reasonable that symbiosis with the bacteria confers a
higher ﬁtness on the squid than the squid would have
living without bacteria. This advantage has not yet been
quantiﬁed.
A, the reservation utility for the bacteria. The beneﬁts of
the interaction for the bacteria are difﬁcult to measure in
practice. However, a necessary condition that might be
possible to measure is that A should be greater than the
ﬁtness inside the squid for nonluminescent bacteria but
less for luminescent bacteria. This seems reasonable: lu-
minescent V. ﬁscheri strains that colonize the squid reach
densities in seawater that are orders of magnitude higher
than those attained by free-living strains (Lee and Ruby
1994). In contrast, experimental replacement of V. ﬁscheri
in the light organ by nonluminescentbacteriashouldresult
in the death of the latter by ROSs.
k, the ratio of the cost for q agents to the cost for Q agents
for a given effort level. This ratio is very high in this case,
as ROSs are lethal for nonluminescent strains. Because
only one task is offered in this case, quantifying k is not
important (as long as it is 11, which is clearly the case);
it could be important in other systems, however, in which
k is smaller. A necessary condition, and one that is prob-
ably easy to measure, is that . k 1 1
The functions are as follows:
, the cost (for the squid) as a function of the reward. c(w)
Unpublished data (E. Ruby, personal communication)
show that the squid’s body weight (a measure of the cost)
decreases with the amount of bacteria hosted in the light
organ (a measure of the reward). These data could be used
to plot . c(w)
, the beneﬁt (for the bacteria) as a function of the u(w)
reward. This is simply the amount of bacteria releaseddaily
as a function of the bacteria hosted by the squid. The
squid releases about 95% of the V. ﬁscheri colony every
dawn and regrows it during the day.
, the beneﬁt (for the squid) as a function of the effort b(e)
of the bacteria. This is not easy to measure, as it seems
that the squid can adjust the amount of light and because
the amount of lightdepends oncoordinationandquorum-
sensing among the bacteria. However, as we state above,
it appears reasonable, though unquantiﬁed, that zeroeffort
by the bacteria confers no beneﬁt on the squid.
, the cost (for the bacteria) as a function of the effort. v(e)
It is known that luminescence demands about 20% of the
metabolic costs of the bacteria. The shape of the function
could be determined by measuring the metabolic costs at
different intensities of light.
What is known about this symbiosis seems consistent
with the assumptions that , , , and are c(w) u(w) b(e) v(e)
increasing in w and e, respectively, and that P, A,a n dk
take on values that are consistent with the screening. That
said, the functions are difﬁcult to measure in practice, even
for a well-characterized symbiosis like V. ﬁscheri–E.
scolopes.
Other Microbial Symbioses
High ROS concentrations occur not only within the light
organ of the bobtail squid but also in other squid tissues
that come into contact with bacteria (Small and McFall-
Ngai 1999; Davidson et al. 2004). Moreover, the enzyme
halide peroxidase, which converts hydrogen peroxide into
highly toxic hypochlorous acid, is common in the tissues
of ﬁsh, mollusks, insects, worms, and cnidarians that sup-
port cooperative bacterial associations (Ruby and McFall-
Ngai 1999). In addition, the roots of leguminous plants
exhibit a massive production of ROSs during the initiation
of symbiosis with nitrogen-ﬁxing rhizobial bacteria, and
this has been interpreted as a mechanism to control bac-
terial entry (Heath and Tifﬁn 2009; Soto et al. 2009;
Glyan’ko and Vasil’eva 2010). It would appear counter-
intuitive to produce compounds that are lethal for bacteria
when trying to establish a symbiosis with bacteria, but an82 The American Naturalist
interesting feature of bacteriophagegeneticsopensthepos-
sibility for screening as a widespread feature of symbioses
with bacteria.
Selva et al. (2009) have shown that H2O2 exposure can
induce the lysis of a pathogenic bacterium, Staphylococcus
aureus. The H2O2 does not kill the S. aureus directly, but
rather it causes low levels of DNA damage that induce the
SOS DNA repair mechanism. Many S. aureus contain
phage DNA; the SOS response activates the phage DNA,
which produces offspring viral particles and lyses the bac-
terial cell, apparently to prevent DNA repair from inad-
vertently mutating important phage genes. The key point
is that inserted phage DNA often contains genes for vir-
ulence factors (“pathogenicity islands”; Schmidt and Hen-
sel 2004; Sui et al. 2009), which creates the necessary cor-
relation between pathogenicity and susceptibility to ROSs.
In theory, then, host organisms should be able to separate
pathogenic from nonpathogenic bacteria by creating an
ROS-rich environment. “Low-quality” species (with path-
ogenicity islands) will be under selection to avoid the cost
of entering into association with the host (because of the
risk of lysis), while “high-quality” (nonpathogenic) species
will not. Note that because the correlation of pathogenicity
with the presence of phage DNA is imperfect, so is the
ability of hosts to screen.
Ant-Plant Symbioses
The problem of hidden characteristics occurs regularly in
ant-plant symbioses. Many ant-plants associate with mul-
tiple ant species that vary in their quality to patrol and
protect the plant’s leaves (Yu and Davidson 1997; Yu 2001;
Heil and McKey 2003; Bruna et al. 2004; Tillberg 2004;
Frederickson 2005). The identity of the ant symbiont tends
to be determined at the time that ant queens colonize (Yu
and Davidson 1997; Yu et al. 2001; Debout et al. 2009).
Screening mechanisms are consistent with two ant-plant
symbioses. The ant-tree Cecropia pungara establishes in
forest gaps, where it is regularly overtopped due to its
intrinsically slow growth, but it can survive at low light,
waiting for the next treefall (Folgarait and Davidson 1994).
In southern Peru, the most frequent ant symbiont, Pachy-
condyla luteola (Yu and Davidson 1997), has a low basal
activity level and a nitrogen-based sting, making it suitable
for low-carbon conditions (Davidson et al. 2003), whereas
other, less suitable ant species exhibit high activity levels
and carbon-based spray defenses (Davidson et al. 2003).
About 90% of C. pungara individuals are inhabited by
Pachycondyla, which in turn establishes onlyonthisspecies
(Yu and Davidson 1997). How is this species speciﬁcity
achieved? We suggest that C. pungara saplings can bias
competition in favor of Pachycondyla queens because sap-
lings produce food bodies early in development, some-
times even before ant housing occurs (Folgarait and Da-
vidson 1994; Yu and Davidson 1997). Only Pachycondyla
queens gather food during colony founding, which is
thought to accelerate worker production, thereby improv-
ing their ability to outcompete other ant species. Thus,
Pachycondyla is both a high-quality and a competitively
superior symbiont, both on account of being a ponerine
ant.
Another apparent example of partner choice is given by
four regionally sympatric species ofMesoamericanantaca-
cias. Two of the species, Acacia cornigera and Acacia col-
linsii, provide high levels of food and housing, and ≥95%
of the trees in these two species are inhabited by mutu-
alistic Pseudomyrmex ant species. The other two species,
Acacia hindsii and Acacia chiapensis, provide much less
food and half the housing, and 40%–60% of trees in these
two low-reward species are inhabited by parasitic, non-
protecting Pseudomyrmex ant species (Heil et al. 2009). In
short, almost all high-reward Acacia trees are inhabited by
high-quality ant symbionts, while about half of the low-
reward Acacia trees are inhabited by low-quality symbi-
onts. Heil et al. (2009) propose that this pattern of as-
sociation results from “massive competition for host
plants” (p. 18092).
When nonprotecting and protecting Pseudomyrmex ant
queens colonize different parts of a high-reward Acacia,
the partcolonizedby the protectingantspeciesgrowsmore
quickly, allowing the protecting ant species to build up a
large colony and kill off competitors (Heil et al. 2009; see
also Frederickson and Gordon 2009). On low-reward Aca-
cia species, patrolling does not increase achieved leaf area,
suggesting higher levels of chemical defenses, a lower feed-
back value of protecting (Heil et al. 2009), and thus a
weakened competitive hierarchy.
In both ant-plant systems, the demanding task is to
compete for the host plant, and this competition is costly
to the ants because of the risk of losing and because any
resources diverted to ﬁghting (or preparing to ﬁght) de-
tract from colony growth. Competition also therefore ap-
pears to be a cause of resource waste for the ants. Similarly,
for the plant, resources invested in promoting competition
(excess housing so that multiple queens can colonize) and
in biasing its outcome (early food production) are wasted
resources except in the context of screening out low-
quality ant species.
Gut Microbiomes
More speculatively, there appears tobeascopeforapplying
ideas from screening to the development and evolution of
symbiotic microbiomes. For instance, the most abundant
component of human milk is lactose (Zivkovic et al. 2010);
the lac operon repressor, lacI, which is needed for theScreening In and Screening Out 83
efﬁcient regulation of lactase production, has been shown
to reduce virulence in the pathogen Salmonella enterica,
although the mechanism remains unclear (Eswarappa et
al. 2009). Host environments rich in lactose could confer
a competitive advantage on lactose-consuming—and thus
lactase-producing—microbes, which would necessarily
also be avirulent. Continuing along this speculative line,
lactose intolerance in hosts might have a selective advan-
tage in habitats with high pathogen prevalence. Moreover,
many of the other oligosaccharides in human milk appear
to be directed toward the preferential nutrition of a co-
evolved, nonpathogenic bacterium associated with human
infants, Biﬁdobacterium longum subsp. infantis, which pre-
sumably confers to this species a growth-rate advantage
over pathogenic bacteria (Zivkovic et al. 2010). However,
for this to qualify as a screening mechanism, we would
need to understand why B. longum does not itself evolve
pathogenicity; an alternative (although not mutually ex-
clusive) hypothesis is that the oligosaccharides evolved to
inhibit the adhesion of pathogens to intestinal cells and
B. longum evolved to take advantage of this resource.
A New Look at Partner Choice
Almost 20 years ago, Bull and Rice’s (1991) partner choice
model proposed that mutualism would be maintained if
hosts could associate only (or mostly) with mutualistic
symbionts. However, other than in some reports of costly
signaling in pollination mutualisms (Møller 1995; Arm-
bruster et al. 2005), no mechanism for achieving partner
choice has been described, prompting some authors to
widen the deﬁnition of partner choice to include mech-
anisms that monitor symbiont behavior and reward or
punish appropriately (Sachs et al. 2004). We propose in-
stead to differentiate between hidden actions and hidden
characteristics, with only the latter being considered prob-
lems of partner choice and modeled using signaling and
screening games. In this, we follow the tradition of games
with asymmetric information in microeconomics, which
consider “signaling” and “screening” to be two solutions
to the problem of hidden characteristics.
Screening games apply to the difﬁcult cases where the
interaction is not a repeated game orvertically transmitted,
where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal
their cooperativeness, and where the host cannot punish
symbiont misbehavior. Many bacterial and fungal sym-
bioses would appear to fall into this category (e.g., Arnold
et al. 2003; Dethlefsen et al. 2007; Gibson and Hunter
2010), which argues that screening could be a common
mechanism for achieving mutualism.
Screening is also consistent with the long-standing hy-
pothesis (Thompson 1982; Gibson and Hunter 2010) that
mutualisms evolved from parasitism. This is because host-
imposed costs seem likely to have evolved from host de-
fenses against parasites. For instance, Ruby and McFall-
Ngai (1999) have speculated that the origin of luciferase
lies in the context of parasitism, because an alternative
pathway for this enzyme produces oxygen radicals that can
be used to attack host tissue. An ancestral V. ﬁscheri using
luciferase as a virulence factor would have been preadapted
to respond to the evolution of ROS production by a host,
with the by-product of light.
Finally, we end with the suggestion that by promoting
long-term speciﬁcity, screening mechanisms could set the
stage for further pairwise coevolution between hosts and
mutualistic symbionts. This could allow symbionts and
hosts to evolve complex mutual-recognition mechanisms
(e.g., Yu and Davidson 1997; Brouat et al. 2001; Mueller
et al. 2004; Oldroyd and Downie 2008; Nyholm et al. 2009)
and pairwise adaptations in symbionts to induce host re-
wards (Risch and Rickson 1981; Heil et al. 2009) and
tolerate host defenses (e.g., Poulsen et al. 2003).
Screening (and partner choice in general) does notelim-
inate the problem of hidden actions, that is, the incentive
to free ride once the interaction is established. For ex-
ample, in the case of the V. ﬁscheri–E. scolopes symbiosis,
the detoxiﬁcation of ROSs is, to a certain extent, a public
good: nonluminescent individuals that managed to estab-
lish an interaction could exploit the public good eventually
produced by its neighbors, which would lead to a social
dilemma (Archetti 2009a, 2009b). Because the host ben-
eﬁts from reducing the number of free riders anyway, this
still leaves room for the evolution of a screening strategy
by the host. In short, screening, like signaling, eliminates
the hidden-characteristics problem, thereby reducing but
not eliminating the hidden-actions problem.
It is a little surprising that screening games have not
already been introduced to the symbiosis literature, given
their prominence in microeconomics. While screening in
economics implies rationality of agents and principals try-
ing to maximize their proﬁt, in biology, rationality is re-
placed by natural selection and the best-response concept
of economics is replaced by evolutionary dynamics. In
other words, while a trained economist can solve the con-
strained-optimization problem to ﬁnd the optimal con-
tract, natural selection replaces rationality in the case of
mutualism and leads to “natural contracts” with the op-
timal costs and rewards. Several types of biological sym-
bioses seem to be good candidates for screening; we have
proposed a few and hope to stimulate further research on
screening in biology.
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